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The quantum advantage arising in a simplified multi-player
quantum game, is found to be a disadvantage when the game’s
qubit-source is corrupted by a noisy ‘demon’. Above a crit-
ical value of the corruption-rate, or noise-level, the coherent
quantum effects impede the players to such an extent that the
‘optimal’ choice of game changes from quantum to classical.
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Information plays a fundamental role in both quantum
mechanics [1] and games [2]. Recently, some pioneering
advances have been made in the field of quantum games
[3,4]. Eisert et al. [3] considered a quantum version of
the famous N = 2 player Prisoner’s Dilemma [2]. The
game showed a fascinating ‘quantum advantage’ as a re-
sult of a novel payoff equilibrium. Benjamin and Hay-
den subsequently argued that this equilibrium [3] results
from an asymmetric restriction in the strategy set; with
unrestricted strategies, it is impossible for such special
‘coherent quantum equilibria’ (CQE) to arise in the max-
imally entangled N = 2 player game [5]. Following our
conjecture [6] that CQE’s arise for N ≥ 3 players, Ben-
jamin and Hayden [7] created a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like
game for N = 3 with a high payoff CQE [7]. This ef-
fect of ‘two’s company, three’s a crowd’ is quite familiar
in physical systems (both classical and quantum) where
complex behaviors tend to emerge only for N ≥ 3 inter-
acting particles.
In this paper the quantum advantage arising in a sim-
plified multi-player quantum game, is found to be a dis-
advantage when the game’s qubit-source is corrupted by a
noisy ‘demon’ whose activity is unknown to the players.
Above a critical value of the corruption-rate, or noise-
level, the coherent quantum effects impede the players to
such an extent that the classical game outperforms the
quantum game; given the choice, the multi-player system
does better if it adopts classical rather than quantum be-
havior.
Following Ref. [7], N = 3 players (or ‘agents’) each
receive a qubit in state |0〉 (or 0). The quantum-
game qubits pass through an entangling Jˆ-gate [3,7]
(see Fig. 1(a)). Without loss of generality [7] we take
Jˆ = 1√
2
(Iˆ⊗3 + iFˆ⊗3) where Fˆ = σˆx. Hence the input
state |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 ≡ |000〉 becomes 1√
2
(|000〉+ i|111〉).
The i’th player’s strategy si is her procedure for deciding
which action to play. The strategy profile s = (s1, s2, s3)
assigns one strategy to each player, and an equilibrium
is a strategy profile with a degree of stability [7], e.g. in
a Nash equilibrium no player can improve her expected
payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. The payoff
table (see Fig. 1(b)) bears some resemblance to the ‘El
Farol’ bar-problem [8] - the analogy is not strictly cor-
rect, however it aids in understanding the pay-off table.
A (small) bar has seating capacity for 2 people, yet three
people want to go. Action 0 (1) means don’t go (go).
State |000〉 means everyone stayed away. Noone gains,
but noone is annoyed that others gained while they lost:
the net payoff is zero per player. State |100〉 means one
person attended, had plenty of seats (i.e. two) but no
company; her payoff is 1. The other two are annoyed
that they didn’t attend and gain from the available seat,
hence each gets -9. State |110〉 means two attend; they
each have a seat and have company so they get 9. The
third person, while not getting maximum enjoyment, is
at least relieved that she didn’t make the effort to attend
(making the bar overfull); she gets 1. State |111〉 means
they all attend. They benefit from lots of company but
not enough seating; they all get 2. Input qubits must be
supplied for each turn of the game. The players assume
that the input qubits are always |0〉 (or 0) hence yielding
the payoffs in Fig. 1(b). The classical game involves only
one of two possible states for each player’s qubit at each
stage (0 or 1) and hence one particular outcome in the
pay-off table of Fig. 1(b). In the quantum game a super-
position of qubit states is possible and hence a superpo-
sition of outcome states will generally arise - the classical
game is therefore embedded in the quantum game. As in
conventional game theory [2], average payoffs are given
by an expectation value over the possible measurement
results.
Classical game players either leave the input qubit 0
unchanged, or flip it to 1. Allowing full knowledge of
the payoff table, classical game players will search for
the dominant strategy payoff (2,2,2) and hence choose
action 1 [7]. Following the approach to N = 3 player
classical games of Ref. [9], each player is assigned a p
value where p is the probability of leaving the input qubit
unflipped, i.e. not flipping the input qubit. For simplic-
ity, suppose p = 0, 1/2 or 1 instead of being continu-
ous [9]. There are 33 = 27 possible profiles or ‘config-
urations’ (p1, p2, p3). These yield ten ‘classes’ each con-
taining C ≥ 1 configurations which are equivalent under
interchange of player label [9]. Table I shows the av-
erage payoffs for each configuration class. Given that
the input is 0, the dominant strategy equilibrium corre-
sponds to all players choosing p = 0, i.e. class (iv) in Ta-
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ble I. Hence although the continuous-parameter p-space
has been discretized to only three values, this descrip-
tion includes the desired dominant strategy equilibrium.
The quantum game players, having followed the analysis
of Ref. [7] in which the special (5,9,5) ‘quantum’ payoff
is presented, independently decide to play for the CQE
given there. In particular, Ref. [7] shows that the strate-
gies Iˆ, σˆx, and
1√
2
(σˆx + σˆz) yield a novel, high payoff
CQE [7] given input qubit |0〉. We will assume that the
set of 33 = 27 strategy profiles formed from these three
simple strategies contain the only strategy profiles sub-
sequently chosen by the quantum game players. Again
this choice is restricted - in particular the quantum game
should include all SU(2) operations [5]. However it allows
for a straightforward comparison between quantum and
classical games without the complication of continuous-
parameter sets. The resulting Table II provides a sim-
ple quantum analog of Table I. σˆx corresponds to not
qubit-flipping with probability p = 0, hence we denote
it as ‘pˆ ≡ 0’. 1√
2
(σˆx + σˆz) corresponds to not qubit-
flipping with probability p = 1/2, hence we denote it as
‘pˆ ≡ 1/2’. Iˆ corresponds to not qubit-flipping with prob-
ability p = 1, hence we denote it as ‘pˆ ≡ 1’. (This corre-
spondence can be established by imagining switching off
the J-gates). In both quantum and classical games, play-
ers are unable to communicate between themselves hence
they cannot coordinate which player picks which strat-
egy. In the quantum game, this is more critical since the
CQE (i.e. the Nash equilibrium given by class (viii) in
Table II) involves players using different pˆ’s. (Although
class (vii) has the same average payoff 〈$ˆ〉 = 19/3, it is
not ‘fair’ to all players and is not a Nash equilibrium).
The payoffs in Tables I and II (indicated by (. . .)) are
in general quite different, i.e. the quantum and classical
systems behave differently.
Now consider the effect of a noisy source created by
an external ‘demon’ (Fig. 1(a)). The demon controls the
input qubit corruption-level, however the players are un-
aware of his presence. This is reminiscent of a ‘Crooked
House’ in gambling - players assume the source (e.g. deck
of cards) is clean even though it may have been corrupted
by the supplier (e.g. dealer). In Table I (II), the aver-
age payoffs with input qubits always 1 (|1〉) are shown
as [. . .]. Again, the quantum and classical payoffs are
generally quite different. Comparing the (. . .) and [. . .]
entries in column 〈$ˆ〉 of Table II, and repeating this for
column $ of Table I, we see that the quantum game ex-
hibits a lower symmetry than the classical game under
interchange of input qubit, e.g. there are two entries
〈$ˆ〉 = (19/3) in Table II but only one entry [19/3]. A
remarkable result is obtained if we now assume that the
source contains equal numbers of |0〉 and |1〉 (or 0 and 1)
qubits on average: the quantum and classical games now
produce identical payoffs for a given class (i.e. 〈$ˆ〉 = $).
Also, the resulting payoff entries for each p-value within
a given class become identical. In short, the quantum
and classical games converge to produce identical payoffs
for a given strategy class.
Since the players are unaware of the demon’s presence,
they will still try to achieve the dominant strategy equi-
librium payoff (2,2,2) for the classical game, i.e. class
(iv) in Table I, and the superior CQE payoff (5,9,5) for
the quantum game, i.e. class (viii) in Table II. We now
examine the average payoff from these two classes to see
which game is ‘optimal’ from the players’ collective per-
spective. Let x be the input qubit noise-level provided
by the demon’s supply, representing the fraction of |1〉
(or 1) qubits received by each agent over many turns of
the game. For simplicity we assume that the demon sup-
plies identical qubits at each turn, i.e. |0〉⊗ |0〉⊗ |0〉 with
probability (1 − x) and |1〉 ⊗ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉 with probability
x. There is no notion of ‘memory’ so far in the system,
hence a periodic qubit sequence . . . |0〉|1〉|0〉|1〉|0〉|1〉 sup-
plied to each agent has the same ‘noise-level’ (x = 0.5) as
a random sequence produced by a memoryless coin-toss.
Class (iv) in Table I yields the average payoff per player
$x = 0.x+ 2.(1− x) = 2− 2x, while class (viii) in Table
II yields 〈$ˆ〉
x
= (−17/3).x+(19/3).(1−x) = 19/3− 12x.
Figure 2 shows these average payoffs as a function of
x. There is a crossover at xcr = 13/30 = 0.433; the
quantum game does better than the classical game for
0 ≤ x < xcr while the classical game does better than
the quantum game for xcr < x ≤ 1. If 〈$ˆ〉x > 2, and
hence 0 ≤ x < x− where x− = 13/36 = 0.361, then
the quantum game does better than the classical game
even if the demon reduces the classical game noise level
to x = 0. If 〈$ˆ〉
x
< 0, and hence x+ < x ≤ 1 where
x+ = 19/36 = 0.528, then the classical game will do bet-
ter than the quantum game even if the demon increases
the classical game noise level to x = 1. Suppose the
demon is replaced by a heat bath at temperature T ; us-
ing the Boltzmann weighting for a two level system (en-
ergy separation ∆E) yields kBT = ∆E(ln[(1−x)x
−1])−1.
Hence kBTcr = 3.7∆E, kBT− = 1.75∆E while kBT+ is
unobtainable (i.e. negative). Given the choice, the ‘opti-
mal’ game for the players to play therefore changes from
being quantum to classical as T (i.e. x) increases. For
T > 3.7∆E, the classical game ‘takes over’ which is con-
sistent with a simple-minded notion of a crossover from
quantum → classical behavior. From the viewpoint of
risk, the class (viii) quantum-game players have high po-
tential gains but large potential losses - this can lead to
large fluctuations in their momentary wealth depending
on the demon’s actions, and hence large risk. By contrast
the class (iv) classical-game players have a smaller risk
because of the potentially smaller wealth fluctuations.
We emphasize that the degradation of the ‘quantum ad-
vantage’ discussed here arises without any decoherence
between the J-gates, i.e. there is full coherence within
the three-player subsystem. Note that the quantum ad-
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vantage would also disappear (in a different way) if the
quantum correlations between the Jˆ and Jˆ† gates were
destroyed, but this is a trivial limit.
An interesting generalization is to consider an evo-
lutionary quantum game in which players may modify
their strategies based on information from the past, i.e.
they ‘learn’ from past mistakes [9]. This introduces a
‘memory’ into the system and allows transitions between
classes in Tables I and II. The memory in the evolu-
tionary version will have a non-trivial effect on whether
the quantum game outperforms the classical one, or vice
versa [6]; the quantum and/or classical game [10] may
even freeze into a given configuration. A deeper under-
standing of the relative ‘advantage’ between such clas-
sical and quantum many-player dynamical games may
eventually shed light on connections between quantum
and classical many-particle, dynamical systems: it is pos-
sible that pay-offs can be used to represent energies, the
entangled state of the many-player quantum game can
represent some exotic many-particle wavefunction, and
the demon’s actions can mimic environmental decoher-
ence. Interestingly, Frieden et al. [11] have proposed that
physical laws are derived from an extremum principle for
the Fisher information of a measurement and the infor-
mation bound in the physical quantity being measured
[11,12] - this EPI (Extreme Physical Information) prin-
ciple represents a game played against Nature. Since the
observer can never win [11], the phenomenon of interest
takes on an all-powerful, but malevolent, force - this is
the information ‘demon’ who is looking to increase the
degree of ‘blur’ of information, and against whom the
players are forced to play.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Three-player game: a) classical (top) and quan-
tum (bottom) with input qubits/bits supplied by a (de-
monic) external source. b) Payoff table.
Figure 2: Average payoff per player (‘agent’) per turn for
quantum game (thick solid line) and classical game (thin
solid line) as a function of input qubit/bit noise-level x
(i.e. demon’s corruption-rate). Dotted lines correspond
to payoff for pure |0〉 (or 0) input, while dotted-dashed
lines are for pure |1〉 (or 1) input.
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TABLE I. Average payoffs for classical game (players or ‘agents’ denoted by ‘a’). p is probability of not
flipping the input qubit. Average payoffs for input qubit 0 are shown as (. . .), those for input qubit 1 are
shown as [. . .], while those for 50 : 50 mixture (i.e. x = 0.5) of input qubits are shown without parentheses.
$ is payoff averaged over the three players, for a given input qubit (0 or 1). $ is $ averaged over input qubit.
Class p = 0 p = 1/2 p = 1 C $ $
i) aaa(1/2)[1/2]1/2 1 (1/2)[1/2] 1/2
ii) a(21/4)[-17/4]1/2 aa(3/4)[1/4]1/2 3 (9/4)[-5/4] 1/2
iii) aa(11/2)[-9/2]1/2 a(3/2)[1/2]1 3 (25/6)[-17/6] 2/3
iv) aaa(2)[0]1 1 (2)[0] 1
v) aaa(0)[2]1 1 (0)[2] 1
vi) a(1)[1]1 aa(-9)[9]0 3 (-17/3)[19/3] 1/3
vii) aa(9)[-9]0 a(1)[1]1 3 (19/3)[-17/3] 1/3
viii) a(5)[-4]1/2 a(0)[0]0 a(-4)[5]1/2 6 (1/3)[1/3] 1/3
ix) aa(1/4)[3/4]1/2 a(-17/4)[21/4]1/2 3 (-5/4)[9/4] 1/2
x) a(1/2)[3/2]1 aa(-9/2)[11/2]1/2 3 (-17/6)[25/6] 2/3
TABLE II. Average payoffs for quantum game (players or ‘agents’ denoted by ‘a’). pˆ ≡ 0 corresponds to
σˆx; pˆ ≡ 1/2 corresponds to 1/
√
2(σˆx + σˆz); pˆ ≡ 1 corresponds to Iˆ (see text). Average payoffs for input
qubit |0〉 are shown as (. . .), those for input qubit |1〉 are shown as [. . .], while those for 50 : 50 mixture (i.e.
x = 0.5) of input qubits are shown without parentheses. 〈$ˆ〉 is payoff averaged over the three players for a
given input qubit (|0〉 or |1〉). 〈$ˆ〉 is 〈$ˆ〉 averaged over input qubit.
Class pˆ ≡ 0 pˆ ≡ 1/2 pˆ ≡ 1 C 〈$ˆ〉 〈$ˆ〉
i) aaa(-15/4)[19/4]1/2 1 (-15/4)[19/4] 1/2
ii) a(-15/4)[19/4]1/2 aa(-15/4)[19/4]1/2 3 (-15/4)[19/4] 1/2
iii) aa(-7/2)[9/2]1/2 a(3/2)[1/2]1 3 (-11/6)[19/6] 2/3
iv) aaa(2)[0]1 1 (2)[0] 1
v) aaa(0)[2]1 1 (0)[2] 1
vi) a(1)[1]1 aa(-9)[9]0 3 (-17/3)[19/3] 1/3
vii) aa(9)[-9]0 a(1)[1]1 3 (19/3)[-17/3] 1/3
viii) a(5)[-4]1/2 a(9)[-9]0 a(5)[-4]1/2 6 (19/3)[-17/3] 1/3
ix) aa(19/4)[-15/4]1/2 a(19/4)[-15/4]1/2 3 (19/4)[-15/4] 1/2
x) a(3/2)[1/2]1 aa(-7/2)[9/2]1/2 3 (-11/6)[19/6] 2/3
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